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Xiaoke Zhang and Tianbiao Zhu (eds), Business, Government and Eco-
nomic Institutions in China. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 359 
pp., including index and references. ISBN 978-3-319-64486-8.
This 11-chapter volume edited by Xiaoke Zhang, Professor at Alliance 
Manchester Business School, UK, and Tianbiao Zhu, Professor and 
Executive Dean at the Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities 
and Social Sciences, Zhejiang University, China, addresses the topic 
of business–government relations in China since the early 1990s. They 
see business–government relations as a deﬁning analytical dimension 
for understanding the Chinese political economy and the character 
of its constitutive institutional arrangements. The volume provides 
answers to three main questions: how can we understand variations in 
business–government relations across China's provinces and cities and 
between various industries? How do business–government relations 
change? And what is the consequence of different relations in relation 
to the transformation of economic institutions?
China is a highly decentralized economy where institutions, market 
structures and ideological orientations vary widely. Despite the obvi-
ous need for solid subnational comparative case studies of China's local 
political economies, only a few studies in the literature adopt such a 
research approach. The volume under review is important and relevant 
because it expands this relatively sparse literature. The volume can be 
seen as part of a 'new regionalism' paradigm within Chinese political 
economy studies and it draws on perspectives from economic geogra-
phers, China studies and comparative political economy. The volume 
puts forward a useful and comprehensive theoretical framework for 
understanding business–government relations, and the contributors to 
the volume exemplify the framework empirically through a number of 
interesting comparative case studies. 
Much of existing literature on business–government relations catego-
rizes China as a state corporatist system. The editors Zhang and Zhu, 
and the contributors to this volume, argue that the corporatist model has 
failed to capture the full dynamics of industry and especially regional 
variations in business–government relations in the light of liberal market 
reforms. In the opening chapter, Zhang and Zhu argue for a more nu-
anced theoretical model. They outline a typology of business–govern-
ment relations with four ideal categories of relations, which depend on 
the degree of authoritative governance of the economy (industrial target-
ing and intervention and control through ownership and regulation), 
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and the strength of market coordination of socio-economic activities 
(the ability of business actors to organize themselves for collective ac-
tion). The four categories are interdependent (strong government/strong 
business), networked (weak government/strong business), statist (strong 
government/weak business), and atomistic (weak government/weak 
business) (p. 11). Zhang and Zhu go on to develop a very comprehensive 
explanation of the variation between the four relationship types by point-
ing to ideological (liberal vs. interventionist), institutional (bureaucratic 
organization and resources, and central–local relations) and market struc-
tural (ﬁrm size, state sector size and international link strengths) differ-
ences between localities and sectors in China. These are all endogenous 
sources of variation in business–government relations. Zhu and Zhang 
argue that exogenous sources of variation through internationalization 
is mediated by the local business–government relationship. However, 
they depart from traditional, more deterministic institutionalist literature 
(such as Paul Pierson's and Douglass North's works) and point out that 
agency, and not only institutional/socio-economic structures, explain 
regional variation. Individual 'change agents' ﬂourish under certain 
institutional conditions and can shape institutional change (p. 34). Their 
typology and theory functions as a useful tool and constructive way of 
distinguishing different types of business–government relations. On the 
downside, Zhang and Zhu are not very explicit on how causality plays 
out in their model. They do not convincingly explain the causality links 
between the factors shaping the relation type: for example, how and 
when market structure mediates/interact with the effect of institutions 
and ideological orientation on business–government relation type. 
In Chapter 2, Tak-Wing Ngo pushes the theoretical framework further 
by decomposing the concept of the 'state/government' and 'business' 
in China. Ngo reveals the many 'states in the state' and the hybrid 
businesses dominating the Chinese economy. Ownership and control 
is blurred: 'All in all, we ﬁnd a variety of business actors, a diversity 
of organizational forms, and a plurality of property rights in China. 
The most prominent actors are not conventional private ﬁrms but new 
breeds of bureaucratic enterprises, politically embedded businesses, joint 
public-private enterprises, and private ﬁrms disguised as collective en-
terprises' (p. 63). He proceeds by arguing that macro-level variables such 
as institutions and market structures are not sufﬁcient when analysing 
business–government relations. He arrives at the concept of closeness 
between businesses and the state. This adds an interesting enterprise 
level element to the macro-level theory laid out in the ﬁrst chapter. 
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Gregory T. Chin. lays out an analysis of the effects of changes in 
business–government relations in Chapter 3. He adds an international 
perspective on the topic by examining the evolution of government–
multinational corporation (MNC) relations in the automotive industry 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Chin unfolds how changes in 
such relations in the automobile sector led to increased technology and 
know-how transfers and foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, which 
accelerated the development of China's automobile sector as a whole. 
Chin shows how an ideological shift away from strong interventionist 
approach towards a more liberal orientation happened in the mid-1990s, 
which led to a change in the regulatory approach, in turn leaving more 
room for autonomy in daily management of joint ventures and a 'in-
terdependent' type of business–government relations. The chapter is 
interesting in itself and especially for scholars engaged in tech-transfers 
and FDI pattern studies.
In Chapter 4, Juanfeng Liu and Jianjun Zhang exemplify the concepts 
of 'statist' and 'networked' business–government relations in a study 
of business–government association relations in the cities of Wuxi and 
Wenzhou. They argue that relations are determined by distinctive sub-
national historical approaches to restructuring the local economy and 
governing development processes. Wuxi is characterized by govern-
ment-led development and a relatively weak private sector (statist model 
relations) leading to 'government organized non-governmental organi-
zations' without any real inﬂuence. In contrast, Wenzhou is characterized 
by local entrepreneur-initiated development, a liberal government and 
a strong autonomous business sector (networked model of relations) 
leading to self-funded and self-governed associations. These associa-
tions have substantial inﬂuence on policy, markets and foreign trade. 
Unfortunately, the study uses older interviews/data from 2001 to 2002 
– in the light of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign and strengthened 
control over civil society, it would be relevant to compare these results 
with business associations in current-day Wuxi and Wenzhou. 
In Chapter 5, Changdong Zhang looks at the relevance of the tax 
system in shaping business–government relations. In his study, the 
local taxation system is the independent variable, and state-business 
relationship type is the dependent variable. Zhang argues that the weak 
authority of the local government over tax systems results in rampant tax 
evasion and rent seeking, which ultimately leads to a 'deinstitutionaliza-
tion' of state–business relations that become collusive or 'networked'. 
He argues that these kind of state–business relations dominate much 
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of local China – no matter the level of development. It would have 
been interesting to include cases/counties with non-collusive relations. 
Zhang's state–business typology is very similar to that in Chapter 1, but 
highlights the connections, or institutional channels, between business 
and government. For example, the 'collaborative and developmental 
state' category in Zhang's typology is similar to the 'interdependent' 
relations category in Chapter 1, the 'regulatory state' is similar to 'statist' 
relations and so forth. In the reader's eyes, it seems unfortunate and 
confusing that the two chapters do not use the same typology. 
The only quantitative study in the volume is provided by Jianguan 
Zhu and Yiping Wu. In Chapter 6, they explore industry and regional 
variations in private entrepreneurs' membership of local people's con-
gresses (PC) and/or people's political consultative conferences. The 
chapter sheds light on the distribution of formal business–government 
relations in China. Zhu and Wu review of the concept of guanxi in the 
realm of political networks – for instance, how both these formal and 
informal connections can be utilized for personal beneﬁt. The inter-
dependent relationship between local governments and private ﬁrms 
makes the study of formal guanxi relations relevant and interesting. They 
measure formal connections between 2000 and 2012, and ﬁnd that agri-
culture, mining and manufacturing industries have the highest level of 
formal political connections. Restaurants, retail and social services have 
the lowest. They ﬁnd an overlap with sectorial distribution of corrup-
tion, which also is the highest within agriculture and mining. They also 
ﬁnd that formal political connections are more widespread in regions 
with rich natural resources or with weaker institutional environments 
(poorer inland provinces). They argue for a strong assertiveness and 
rising power of the local PCs by referring to cases from the 2000s. This is 
not representative for contemporary policymaking under the Xi admin-
istration, where the Party's power over the state has been strengthened 
signiﬁcantly compared with the early 2000s. 
The volume continues in Chapter 7 with an interesting historical per-
spective on the international contexts/globalizations inﬂuence on the 
formation of local Chinese business–government relations and varying 
elements of corporatism, clientelism and pluralism. The editor Tianbiao 
Zhu shows how the decentralization of governance in China allowed 
different levels of government to deal with globalization challenges 
according to local conditions, which led to different business–govern-
ment relations. China's late development and entry into the global 
economy meant that more organizational power was needed to target 
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the development of industries, including a central planning system. 
Globalization increased pressure and competition, which demanded 
active state control over economic development. This gives China strong 
elements of corporatism in business–government relations. However, 
the relative decline of the state power and rise of the private sector 
after 1978 also led to elements of pluralism. Finally, the incorporation 
of private entrepreneurs into the Chinese Communist Party and the 
development of a mix of formal and informal connections between the 
Party and businesses led to clientelism. 
The institutional consequences of changing business–government 
relations are the focus in the following chapters. Richard W. Carney in 
Chapter 8 turns his attention towards the implications of local business–
government relations for corporate governance reforms. He outlines the 
problems of 'agency cost', where the owners/shareholders' interests are 
being misrepresented by the management, and 'tunnelling', where one 
or more majority owners expropriate wealth from minority sharehold-
ers. Through a case study of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) and the private company BYD, 
Carney argues that the solution to these corporate governance issues differ 
in Shanghai and Guangdong due to different structures of state–business 
relations. SAIC's corporate governance was reformed through joint ven-
tures with foreign companies, while BYD's depended on stock listing in 
Hong Kong raising capital and adhering to the new auditing demands. It 
would be interesting to study a private auto company in Shanghai and a 
state-owned company in Guangdong as an addition to Carney's analysis: 
this would make a more cohesive comparative design.
In Chapter 9, Yukyung Yao contributes with a theoretical and con-
ceptual discussion on the power of large SOEs relative to the state. Yao 
makes the argument that China's central level business–government 
relations can be characterized by 'socialist corporatism', which implies 
that the dominant role of the state is materialized in a predominance 
of state planning agency and the Party organization. Yao argues that 
the National Development and Reform Commission's (NDRC) power 
to regulate the central SOEs and implement industrial policy is increas-
ing, while the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission's (SASAC) power and the business associations' powers 
are decreasing. The strength of the chapter is its conceptualization of 
'socialist corporatism', which ﬁts very well with other chapters in the 
book. The weakness is a lack of structural empirical analysis to back 
up the concept across provinces and industries in China and the lack 
_______________________________________________________________________ 135
___________________________________________________________________ Reviews
of cross-references to the study of business associations in Chapter 4 of 
this edited volume. In addition, the analysis would have been stronger if 
more recent ﬁgures for SOE sector development had been provided. 
The central government level analysis is also the focus in Chapter 10, 
where Jin Zhang analyses how the large Chinese oil SOEs are embedded 
in the Party-state, and how their behaviour is shaped by commercial 
and political goals. Zhang emphasizes the dual corporate governance 
structure of the SOEs and their political and legal logic: a classic western 
company structure (general meeting, board of directors and manage-
ment) is embedded in a political governance framework with the Party 
committee at the centre. In addition, personal appointment decisions 
are managed by the Party's Central Organization Department, and the 
SASAC, NDRC and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) approve all 
strategic overseas investments, partnerships and so on. Chief Execu-
tive Ofﬁcers move between positions in the state, the Party, and the 
SOEs. This shows how the SOEs behaviour/corporate management is 
explained by the institutional structure of the state's economic and po-
litical agencies in which the SOEs are embedded. The chapter does not 
go into detailed case studies to illustrate the points raised but gives the 
reader a clear overview of the workings of the central strategic SOEs.
In the ﬁnal chapter, the editor Xiaoke Zhang looks at how technology 
development regimes vary with regional differences in structures of in-
dustrial governance. Zhang shows how the dirigiste pattern of high-tech 
industrial governance in Shanghai contrasts with the interdependent 
technology development regime in Shenzhen. State control over ﬁnancial 
institutions and resource allocation, organization of universities and 
research institutions, links between private and public market players 
and coherence and strength of state agencies, are the main differences 
between the two regimes. Zhang's conclusions build on a very impres-
sive base of 150 interviews with managers, business associations, local 
ofﬁcials and academics in 2013–2017 and is thereby the best-researched 
contribution in the volume. 
All the contributions in the volume except Chapter 6 use a qualitative 
research approach – a few more quantitative studies in the mix would 
have strengthened the volume, as would more up-to-date data and 
interviews. Nevertheless, the volume is an inspirational read for any 
scholar of China's political economy. The volume ends on the happy 
note that China's continued integration into the global economy will 
lead to a stronger business community and civil society and a more 
balanced relationship between government and business that supports 
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the capacity to innovate. Yet the reader may think that the opposite 
scenario is currently unfolding, with a strengthening of the state sector, 
the creation of global state-owned champions and a Party that aspires 
to gain absolute control over business, state and civil society as a whole. 
However, one thing is sure: regional and industry variations in busi-
ness–government relations are likely to persist and continue being an 
important research topic. 
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Jonathan Fenby, Will China Dominate the 21st Century? Cambridge: Pol-
ity, 2017. 154 pp., ISBN 1509510974.
In the shadows of a looming trade war between China and the USA, 
this second edition of Jonathan Fenby's 2014 book Will China Dominate 
the 21st Century? has never been more relevant. With only 154 pages it 
is an easy read that provides a realistic take on China's ability to domi-
nate this coming century. It is an enlightening and engaging book for 
anyone with an interest in China and its current grip on the political 
and economic situation that feeds into the global arena. For the more 
seasoned China scholar the main points may already be well known and 
the book can safely be placed on the shelf as another realist interpreta-
tion of why China will not succeed in having any meaningful impact 
on dominating the global agenda in the twenty-ﬁrst century. 
Looking into China's political setting, Fenby describes Xi Jinping as 
an uncommon man, standing out in a world where strong leadership 
of big economically powerful countries has become a rarity. Xi is por-
trayed as China's new emperor standing at the centre of a personality 
cult, and as 'a leader of a nation that sees itself existing on a plane of its 
own, with little or no need of a global order shared with other nations' 
(p. 18). The return to rule by a single dominant ﬁgure has increased 
the risks inherent in Chinese society, as its leadership style has become 
increasingly totalitarian. The denial of a political role for the people 
provides a negative foundation for its government, bringing with it 
systemic weaknesses which grow in scope as China develops. The 
Communist Party and Xi Jinping have no rivals for power, and while Xi 
has eliminated any form of opposition, Fenby describes this trend as a 
general fetish by Chinese rulers (p. 19). Throughout the Party's history 
